rectly the same power that it might exercise directly."I Modem constitutional law continues to recognize that the delegation of power by a state does not create a distinct sovereign entity.' 2 This is clearly illustrated by the fact that clauses of the Constitution that limit the states, such as the double jeopardy clause,' 3 the equal protection clause,1 4 the due process clause,' 5 and the contracts clause,' 6 also limit their political subdivisions.
In Waller v. Florida, ' 7 for example, the Supreme Court held that a defendant convicted in municipal court for violation of a city ordinance could not be convicted on a state charge for the same act, as the second trial would constitute double jeopardy under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In answer to the State's argument that cities are autonomous entities set apart from the state much as the states are set apart from the federal government, the Court replied: "Political subdivisions of States--counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions."t"
In Waller the Court recognized the existence of only two sovereign entities within the United States-the federal and the state governments. Moreover, the opinion made it clear that although the state may delegate its sovereignty, it cannot multiply it.
Reapportionment cases, such as Avery v. Midland County,' 9 reinforce the view expressed by the Court in Waller. In Avery, the Court found that although the Texas state legislature was itself properly apportioned, the act of a county commission in improperly apportioning itself constituted state action subject to the restraints of the equal protection clause. In support of its decision the Court explained that "[tjhe Equal Protection Clause reaches the exercise of state power however 11. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at 186; Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S.
at Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 667, 676 (1872) .
12. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978 The Supreme Court has characterized the power to delegate authority as an essential component of each state's sovereignty, for the tenth amendment 25 protects the states' right to define and organize their own governmental functions in a manner that suits their particular needs and convenience. " [I] Columbus, 203 U.S. 311, 320 (1906) ("That the ordinance of the common counsel of a municipal corporation may constitute a law within the meaning of this constitutional clause is too well settled to admit of doubt").
22. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (acknowledging the state's interest in delegating authority as well as the people's interest in retaining certain powers on a local level, but finding that the state is nonetheless responsible for local governmental activities that violate the equal protection clause); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state action found when the parking authority, created by the city, leased space in a building it owned to a private restaurant that discriminated against blacks); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1958) (actions of local school officials in school segregation case found to be actions of the state in violation of the equal protection clause); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (state action found in discriminatory actions of city board of directors, despite state disapproval of the activities, as indicated by the fact that the state joined in the suit against the board); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (any municipal ordinance adopted under state authority constitutes state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment).
23. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960) (local charges based on city loitering and disorderly conduct ordinances so devoid of evidentiary support as to violate the due process clause).
24. See, e.g., See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (city ordinance violated the fourth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (city ordinance violated first amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
25. U.S. CONsT. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
26. DUKE LAWJOURN4L [Vol. 1979 [Vol. :1042 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigtuez, 27 an equal protection case, the Court emphasized the importance of the states' self-structuring and delegating power and their need to exercise this power free of federal interference. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court refused to overturn the Texas system of allocating state support to schools in proportion to the amount of local taxes each district could raise, though the system had a differential impact on poor and wealthy districts. Relying on the principles of federalism, the Court characterized the suit as nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. In doing so, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. 2 , does not divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possessed before the charter was granted." Id at 308. These subdivisions have no inherent right of selfgovernment that places them beyond the legislative control of the state. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 186 (1923) . The arrangements made between the state and its political subdivisions are not considered contracts and are, accordingly, not subject to the contracts clause of the Constitution, Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 558-59 (1879), nor does the contracts clause or the due process clause inhibit the state from withdrawing or otherwise disposing of property held by the subdivision for governmental purposes, City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at 188. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-81 (1907 414-15 (1978) .
37. Cities and counties are always considered independent from the state for eleventh amendment purposes. A large body of case law exists concerning which political subdivisions other than cities and counties are independent-and therefore unprotected-and which subdivisions are simply alter egos of the state. See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth. 268 F. Supp. 568, 574 (D.N.J. 1967) . See text accompanying notes 50-54 infra. DUKE LAW JOUR4L [Vol. 1979 [Vol. :1042 puzzling for reasons other than the inconsistency with the holdings under other portions of the Constitution. This notion is also in apparent conflict with constitutional doctrines expressed in the tenth and eleventh amendments. The Court has recognized that a purpose of the eleventh amendment is to protect the internal administration of the sovereign state from federal encroachment 38 Nonetheless, in differentiating between states and political subdivisions in eleventh amendment cases, the Court ignores this purpose. If a state decides to keep a particular fiscal or regulatory authority within the governmental framework of "the state" itself, it may use that authority without fear of suit in federal court. But if it chooses to delegate the authority to an incorporated political subdivision, both the subdivision and, practically speaking, the state, will be subject to unconsented-to suits for money damages in federal courts. Thus, the state's protection against suits in federal court depends almost entirely on whether or not it decides to delegate. 39 Likewise, even when "the state" itself undertakes a purely proprietary, as opposed to governmental, function, it may be immune from suit, see, e.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909) . Its subdivisions performing strictly governmental functions directed by the state, however, will not be granted immunity. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979) ("mhe Court has consistently refused to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a 'slice of state power' ").
rational explanation for the variance. If the difference in interpretation serves some purpose, that purpose should then be weighed against the infringement on state sovereignty caused by its promotion. 4 This discussion, apart from vague references to the fact of incorporation, offers no reasoning in support of the finding that subdivisions are entities apart from the state for purposes of jurisdiction. Instead, past practices alone served as the basis for the Lincoln Coim y result.
7
Lincoln County is now routinely cited as the authority for denying political subdivisions eleventh amendment protection. Rather than questioning or explaining the basis for the Lincoln County rule, 4 " recent cases focus on whether a particular governmental entity is sufficiently independent of the state (or sufficiently similar to a county or city) to justify the loss of immunity.
49
Since the courts have failed to offer any explicit explanation for the Lincoln County rule, an explanation must be sought from some other source. One possible source is the eleventh amendment case law developed by courts in deciding whether particular governmental entities are a part of the state or, like cities and counties, independent subdivisions subject to suit in the federal courts. Factors used in making this differentiation may provide a clue to the purpose for which the distinction is made. A second source is the theoretical foundations of the eleventh amendment and an examination of whether the amendment's purposes are promoted by excluding subdivisions from coverage. [T]he amendment in question does not deny jurisdiction to the federal courts of the suit, for it denies to them jurisdiction only of suits against "one of the United States," and not against a subdivision thereof. If the federal courts do not, by reason ofsaid amendment, have jurisdiction of suits against municipal corporations, it is hard to understand upon what ground it has been that they have so often taken jurisdiction of suits against them.
Indirect Explanation Through Courts'Application of the Excep
Id at 423.
48. Courts holding that the acts of political subdivisions are "state actions" restricted by the fourteenth amendment but that the subdivisions are not "state defendants" within the meaning of the eleventh amendment often acknowledge the inconsistency in the two definitions of "state." Nevertheless, the courts offer no rationale for the difference. REv. 207, 242 (1968) .
To add to the general confusion, while the subdivision itself may be subject to suit in federal court even though it performs state governmental functions, an official of the subdivision who is named as an individual defendant in the same action may claim immunity from suit under the principles governing suits against state officers. See C. JACOBS 188 n. 11 (1972) .
49. See text accompanying notes 50-54 infra.
political subdivisions we know today were few. As a result, when considering eleventh amendment protection for political subdivisions, the Court focused its attention primarily on cities and counties. The rule was straightforward: immunity for the state, no immunity for cities and counties. However, as time passed and state governments grew, they undertook increasingly complex duties and created scores of less easily categorized political entities to perform them. Numerous cases arose to determine whether such entities as toll bridge authorities, 5 ' highway commissions, 51 liquor control boards, 52 and state schools 5 3 are "more like a county or city" or more like an "arm of the State. '54 These cases suggest a variety of factors that courts will consider in deciding whether a given governmental entity will enjoy eleventh amendment immunity.
(a) Incorporation and other traditional indicia of autonomy. One important consideration that the courts have relied upon since the earliest cases is whether or not the entity in question has its own corporate indentity 5 Because incorporation generally implies the existence of a separate, self-determining entity, the fact that the state incorporated the entity arguably indicates that it intended to create a body separate from itself. Of particular importance is the corporation's power to sue and be sued in its own name. 6 The older cases sometimes referred to cities and counties simply as "corporations" and subjected them to general provisions of state corporate law. 57 Another line of early cases stressed that the state could not confer its eleventh amendment immunity on a proprietary business corporation simply by allowing incorporation or by participating in the business corporation as a stockholder. In fact, the state itself would be stripped of its immunity when participating actively in the business transactions of such corporations. 58 This case law could have been the 50. See, e.g., Fowler v. California Toll-Bridge Auth., 128 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1942 basis for the Court's finding that incorporated political subdivisions, like private corporations, cannot share in the state's immunity even though the state maintains an active interest in the entity's functions.
The rationale behind the Court's refusal to allow the state to confer its immunity on proprietary business corporations, however, was that a corporation is a different "person" from those who are its stockholders. 59 This principle should not apply to incorporated political subdivisions since the state cannot be characterized as their stockholder. Further, a distinction can readily be made between a state's participation in a private or semiprivate business operation and its participation in a governmental function of the kind generally pursued by incorporated political subdivisions. 60 Several non-eleventh amendment cases decided shortly before Lincoln County serve further to undercut the theory that incorporation of a political subdivision creates an entity so independent and distinct from the state as logically to justify a denial of state immunity. The cases demonstrate that incorporated political subdivisions cannot and should not be equated with private corporations.
In United States v. Railroad Co.,6 the Supreme Court undertook to describe the "nature and character" of municipal corporations and their "connection with the government of the state":
[C]ities and towns. . . are allowed to assume to themselves some of the duties of the State. . . . but having neither property nor power for the purposes of personal aggrandizement, they can be considered in no other light than as auxiliaries of the government, and as the secondary deputies and trustees and servants of the people.
• . . [T] he main distinction between public and private corporations is, that over the former the legislature. . .has the exclusive and unrestrained control; and . . . as it may create, so may it modify or destroy, as public exigency requires or recommends .... It possesses the right to alter, abolish, or destroy all such institutions 62 59. Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. at 323-24; see Mathis, supra note 48, at 237. 60. The courts have often recognized the distinction between government participation in proprietary and strictly governmental functions. Indeed, the proprietary or governmental aspects of a particular political agency are often cited as factors to be considered when deciding whether the agency is an independent subdivision or a part of the state for purposes of suit in federal court. See, e.g., Gainer v. School Bd., 135 F. Supp. 559, 569 (N.D. Ala. 1955) . However, while this consideration is often recited, the majority of cases in which state immunity from suit has been denied have dealt with subdivisions engaged in governmental functions, rather than proprietary functions. Further, when the court determines that it is the state itself that is directly performing a proprietary function, immunity may be granted. On the contrary, the state's absolute control of the political corporation stemmed from the subdivision's role as a mere "instrumentality of the state," irrespective of the subdivision's incorporated or unincorporated status. 66 The act of the state in incorporating the subdivision was not interpreted as creating an autonomous entity with rights against the state and the power to pursue interests of its own. Rather, the subdivision was incorporated only because incorporation was necessary to give the subdivision the powers it needed to conduct the business that the state desired it to pursue on its behalf. 75 In Ford Motor Co., the Court focused on the ultimate source from which funds to pay the judgment would come, holding that when the action is "in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit. ... 76 Recently, some lower courts have gone so far as to make the potential source of payment for a judgment the controlling factor, as in Adams v. Richland School District One: 77 [WI]here it appears that the money damages sought against the defendant would not result in any additional expenditure of public funds from the state treasury, the logical conclusion is that the protection of the eleventh amendment is unavailable notwithstanding other factors which might indicate state control over the defendant. That county funds would be used to satisfy any possible judgment is of no significance under the eleventh amendment. 78 Under this theory, an ancillary or indirect effect on the state treasury is insufficient to trigger eleventh amendment protection. 79 The presence of significant amounts of direct state monetary aid to the defendant also fails to create immunity as long as the plaintiff's success in the action will not affect the amount of state funds flowing to the defendant. 80 74 The interest in protecting state treasuries from federal interference is widely acknowledged as a major purpose of the eleventh amendment. 8 ' Insofar as suits against political subdivisions with "independent" treasuries do indeed allow recovery without disturbing state resources, there is a reasonable basis for differentiating between the political subdivisions and their states for eleventh amendment purposes. The courts adopting this rationale, however, appear to assume that the only money the state possesses is in a central state treasury, and that any funds not in this treasury are not state funds, despite their use for state governmental purposes. This approach is unrealistic. Funds in the hands of a state-created, state-controlled government corporation must surely also be state funds. 82 Numerous early cases firmly establish that the state has full control over governmental property held by its political subdivisions, and that it may direct the property's use or recall it from the subdivision at will. 83 In Meriwether v. Garrett, 84 the Supreme Court recognized that the property of state-created government corporations was the property of the state: "Upon the dissolution [of the corporation], the property passes under the immediate control of the State, the agency of the corporation then ceasing." 85 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the revenues of a municipal corporation are, like the revenues of the state, not subject to federal taxation, since the taxation of municipalities would hinder the right of states to "administer their own affairs through their legislative, executive, and judicial departments, in their own manner through their own agencies ... ,,86 If funds of the municipality are in fact funds of the state for tax purposes, it seems that they should be for other purposes as well.
It may be assumed that the state has granted its subdivision the power to hold funds so that the subdivision may provide its citizens with some service or benefit. When a federal court renders a judgment against such a political corporation, the state may be just as effectively hindered in its ability to provide the service as it would be if the judgment were rendered against the state itself. A suit in federal court against a political subdivision, then, may allow federal interference with state treasuries. 88 Rather than providing a rational basis for the eleventh amendment differentiation of states and their subdivisions, the state treasury approach argues for granting the subdivisions the same immunity enjoyed by the state.
(c) The laws ofthe state. Many courts, in deciding whether a particular political subdivision will be granted state immunity, have made a point of asserting that the state law defining the subdivision will be afforded great weight in the decisionmaking process. 8 9 On its face, this would appear to mitigate the federalism problems inherent in differentiating the subdivisions from the state. It is apparent, however, that the courts are not saying that the state may, through its laws, declare its intent that a subdivision share its immunity in federal court. Rather, the court will look to the manner in which the state has structured the subdivision and then turn to federal case law to determine whether the particular structure employed by the state will entitle the subdivision to immunity. 90 Therefore, though state law may declare that a subdivi-88. On the federal level, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the funds of a federal government corporation are the funds of the federal government. In Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1939), the Supreme Court faced the question of whether a national bank could pledge assets to secure deposits of funds made by a government corporation in the same way that it would pledge assets to secure deposits of the United States Treasury. The Court held that
[s]o far as the powers of a national bank to pledge its assets are concerned, the form which Government takes-whether it appears as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, or the Inland Waterways Corporation-is wholly immaterial. The motives which lead Government to clothe its activities in corporate form are entirely unrelated to the problem . 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1973 ) (weight apparently given to state case law declaring that "school districts are instrumentalities of the state acting in its behalf'; but decision actu-sion is created by the state for the sole purpose of delivering an essential governmental service, if the subdivision is incorporated and capable of raising revenues it is likely to be treated as a separate entity from the state, subject to suit in federal court. 91 The courts' emphasis on mechanical structure rather than the state's actual intent indicates that the consideration of state law by federal courts is, in reality, merely a mechanism for applying federal law. As such, the test is incapable of ameliorating the federalism problems inherent in the differentiation between state and subdivision. Furthermore, this structural emphasis creates the state's chief dilemma. In order for the state to carry on its complex variety of governmental duties, it must delegate to manageable units. To delegate effectively, the state must endow the units it creates with the powers necessary successfully to execute the duties delegated to them. But if the subdivisions have these powers, they will be treated as "separate entities," and thus outside the blanket of eleventh amendment state immunity from suit. The state's choice, then, is to choose not to delegate, which may lead to problems of inefficient, unwieldly management, or to delegate and give up its immunity from suit in federal court.
B. Facilitation of the Overall Purpose of the Eleventh Amendment.
Since cases dealing with immunity under the eleventh amendment fail to reveal any justification for distinguishing between states and their political subdivisions, one may turn next to the purposes of the eleventh amendment as a whole. If the purposes of the eleventh amendment are promoted by holding "the state" immune while excluding its subdivisions, the difference in treatment may be justified.
Fear of War Debt Enforcement and Federal Encroachment on
State Treasuries. One of the reasons most frequently given to explain the passage of the eleventh amendment was the fear that the states would be forced, by means of suits in federal court, to pay their very considerable war debts. 92 Many feared that the states would face ruin ally based on the fact that a judgment against the school board would "ultimately reduce state funds" [Vol. 1979 [Vol. :1042 if forced to pay the full face value of these debts. 93 If protection from payment of war debts was the sole purpose behind passage of the eleventh amendment, there may be an explanation for differentiating between the states and their political subdivisions: there may have been no danger of suits to enforce war debts against cities and counties, and therefore no need to protect them. For that matter, even if subdivisions had incurred debts similar to the states, Revolutionary War debts were no longer a concern for states or subdivisions one hundred years after passage of the eleventh amendment, when Lincoln County was decided. Excluding subdivisions from protection might, accordingly, have been viewed as a means for narrowing the impact of an amendment no longer needed. If the amendment had indeed served its purpose, however, it should have been removed from the Constitution altogether rather than narrowed in such a way as to raise new problems under the still viable tenth amendment.
Confining the purpose of the eleventh amendment solely to protection of war debts gives the amendment an excessively narrow interpretation. It seems likely that if war debt protection were the amendment's sole purpose, it would have been worded accordingly. In fact, courts have tended to generalize the purpose of the eleventh amendment to one of protecting state fiscal autonomy against any type of private suit for damages commenced in federal court. 94 But this purpose also fails to provide a meaningful justification for differentiating between states and their subdivisions, since the governmental property Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682, 683 (1976) . But see C.
Powers Issues in Controversies about
JACOBs 68-70. Jacobs argues forcefully that federal judicial enforcement of war debt obligations was not a major concern in the passage of the eleventh amendment. According to Jacobs, war debts were not unmanageable at the time the eleventh amendment was passed. The Federalists, who controlled Congress at the time, believed that satisfaction of public debts was a sacred obligation. Had they seriously believed that the states would be financially irresponsible, they would never have voted for the amendment. It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the states were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and the court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so extensively entertained, . . . [the eleventh] amendment was proposed in congress and adopted by the state legislatures. . . . Those who were inhibited from commencing a suit against a state, or from prosecuting one which might be commenced before the adoption of the amendment, were persons who might probably be its creditors. There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister states would be creditors to any considerable amount, and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace. Ayers, 97 where the Court stated: The very object and purpose of the 11 th Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. It was thought to be neither becoming nor convenient that the several States of the Union, invested with that large residium of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private persons . . . or that the course of their public policy and the administration of their public affairs should be subject to and controlled by the mandates ofjudicial tribunals without their consent, and in favor of individual interests.
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Scholarly commentators have argued that the eleventh amendment was meant to reverse Chisholm v. Georgia 9 9 and reinstate the framers' original understanding that the doctrine of sovereign immu- 130 (1978) ; Baker 144-45; Cullison, supra note 92, at 9; Nowak, supra note 92, at nity would qualify article III of the Constitution. ' It has also been suggested that the amendment was meant to enact the dissenting opinion of Justice Iredell in Chisholm.' Some scholars have theorized that the eleventh amendment incorporated the doctrine of sovereign immunity into the Constitution, while others believe that it merely insured the continued existence of the doctrine in common law, free from interference of the courts but subject to modification by Congress.' 2 Regardless of the exact approach to sovereign immunity taken by the eleventh amendment, it is questionable whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity, in any form, provides serious justification for the differentiation of the states from their political subdivisions.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was brought to the United States from England, but it does not appear that the United States' subsequent differentiation of states and their subdivisions for purposes of granting sovereign immunity was based on any parallel practice in England. Suits against counties and cities of Britain were not generally maintained at the time of and prior to passage of the eleventh amendment. 1 0 3 The extent and source of the powers and duties of these British subdivisions differed from those of their American counterparts, however, making the meaning of this fact difficult to assess. 04 Corporate franchises granted to the British subdivisions were more nearly like those of private corporations, making them less subject to legislative control than American subdivisions. 0 5 Attempting to draw a comparison between American and British subdivisions does not seem 104. It is difficult to look to the British form of sovereign immunity for answers to questions about our own, as the doctrine, when brought to the United States, was applied to a government whose philosophy and structure differed greatly from the one the doctrine was originally developed to serve. See Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting); C. JACOBS 150-55; Baker 154; McCormack, supra note 96, at 504.
105. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 531 (1879).
fruitful in any case, since it is not clear that the rule of county or city immunity in Britain was related to the British doctrine of sovereign immunity.
1 1 6 Accordingly, British precedent does not offer a convincing explanation for the holding in Lincoln County. In the United States, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it developed in state law, generally treated political subdivisions as a part of the state and entitled them to the state's immunity, at least insofar as they were acting in a governmental capacity. 0 7 If they were to be held liable, it was because the state expressly permitted it.'" There has been no explanation why the federal law of sovereign immunity, as purportedly applied through the eleventh amendment, should differ from the state law if both the state and federal sovereign immunity laws are to serve the same general purpose. 0 9 It is, however, by no means certain that sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment is meant to serve the same purpose as it serves under state law. In the eleventh amendment context, sovereign immunity is an expression of the principles of federalism."1 0 As one scholar has termed it, while the purpose of common law sovereign immunity is to prevent courts and plaintiffs generally from interfering with the workings of government, sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment was designed specifically to prohibit the federal government, through its courts, from interfering with the internal workings of state government."' Indeed, Professor Jacobs has gone further to assert that [n] either the text of the Eleventh Amendment nor the events accounting for its adoption indicate that its principal purpose was to affirm or sanction the immunity of the sovereign; The amendment can be better understood as the constitutional outcome of the first in a protracted series of confrontations between the states, on the one hand, and the federal judiciary, on the other, over the nature of the Federal Union and the position of the states in the constitutional order." t 2
Another scholar suggests that immunity from suit in federal court under the eleventh amendment is a constitutional right guaranteed to states against individual plaintiffs much like immunity from self-incrimination is guaranteed to individuals against the state and federal governments." t 3 The common element in each of these explanations of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment is the implication that the purpose of the eleventh amendment, either at passage or through subsequent construction by the courts, was to balance the relative powers of the federal and state governments and to prohibit federal interference with the states' discretion to define and structure their own internal functions. If the purpose of the eleventh amendment is to serve the principles of federalism, the exclusion of state political subdivisions from its protection not only fails to further that goal but in fact frustrates it. 11 4 The state's right freely to delegate its powers and responsibilities in the way it deems most efficient is hampered by the fact that if it chooses to delegate power it must forego the immunity it would otherwise enjoy." t t Further, judgments for damages against the treasuries of political subdivisions restrict the states' own ability to provide governmental services. 6 112. C. JACOBS 161-62. Professor Warren states that a major factor inducing passage of the eleventh amendment was the fear of losing the independence of state governments in the "increasing growth and consolidation of the powers of the Federal Government in all its branches." I C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 92 (1922).
113. Baker 163-65. This interpretation is supported by language in Supreme Court opinions. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) , the Court, in deciding whether the state had constructively waived its eleventh amendment immunity, held: "Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here. In deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language.
Id at 673. See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976) .
114. Professor Baker has specifically addressed the issue of the differentiation of states from their political subdivisions under the federalism theory of the eleventh amendment. He concludes that although subdivisions perform state governmental functions, "the courts have recognized that these units are often so removed from state government that subjecting them to suit in federal court has few federalism repercussions." Baker 176. He observes that this is not always the case, however, and acknowledges that the policy stressed in Usery raises questions about whether state sovereignty is unhampered by denying political subdivisions the shield of immunity. Eleventh amendment cases do not offer compelling reasons for providing federal court immunity to states while denying this immunity to their political subdivisions. Further, this differentiation is not necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the eleventh amendment was passed. In fact, differentiation of states and their subdivisions undercuts at least two of the chief purposes given for the amendment's passage and continued enforcement" 7 and impinges on the governmental discretion of the states in a manner inconsistent with sound principles of federalism." 8 It seems appropriate, therefore, to consider abandoning the policy of differentiation in order to create a coherent eleventh amendment policy that is consistent with the rest of the Constitution.
This suggestion of change may seem disconcerting given the fact that the state-subdivision distinction has been observed for over a century, and that it has served as a basic premise underlying important decisions. Indeed, the ramifications of change at this point might seem even more harmful than the encroachment on federalism that the rule presently permits. On closer examination of recent eleventh amendment developments, however, it appears that the time may be right for the change.
For the first time in many years legal scholars and the courts are subjecting the eleventh amendment and the related doctrine of sovereign immunity to close scrutiny. The Supreme Court has undertaken some major adjustments in the area that have enhanced the clarity and coherence of the law and have evinced a new attitude toward the breadth of eleventh amendment protection. The trend developing from these decisions could readily accommodate a revision in the eleventh amendment treatment of political subdivisions. Constitutional scholars have also recently focused their attention on the eleventh amendment, reaching important conclusions regarding the breadth of the immunity it grants to states. After considering the baffling and seemingly contradictory array of eleventh amendment cases, Lawrence Tribe concludes that [tihe only satisfying reconciliation of the cases with a conception of the eleventh amendment as either conferring a category of rights upon the states or at least confirming the states' retention of rights against unconsented suit, is to distinguish rights conferred against the federal judiciary from rights conferred against Congress.
A. Recent Cases Recognizing Congressional Power to
be construed as applying to Congressional enactments, even though the amendment is framed only in terms of the judicial power." ' t3 1 Martha Field goes a step beyond Tribe and Nowak by suggesting that sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that is not constitutionally compelled.' 3 2 According to Professor Field, the eleventh amendment was intended only to overturn the Chisholm case, in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution as abrogating sovereign immunity.1 33 The amendment restored the original constitutional neutrality on the subject, thus allowing state sovereign immunity to continue to exist in its common law form. 134 Because sovereign immunity exists only in common law, Field concludes that Congress has the power to pass laws subjecting the states to all types of private suits in federal court. The only checks on this power are the tenth amendment and the requirement that Congress stay within its delineated powers. 35 In instances in which Congress is silent, however, the eleventh amendment prevents courts from implying a right to sue states in federal court. 1
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C. The Diminished Constitutional Status of Sovereign Immunity.
Professor Field's theory not only lends support to the growing trend that recognizes congressional power as a major limitation on the eleventh amendment, it also greatly reduces the constitutional status of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 37 The Supreme Court recently decided a case that diminished the importance of the doctrine on another front, lending implicit support to Field's theory.
Nevada v. Hall 38 involved the question of whether a state may claim immunity from suit in the courts of another state. Nevada, the named defendant in a personal injury suit filed in the California courts, 39 claimed that the Constitution implicitly protected it from state fiscal policy. A state would be forced to find funds to pay for liabilities it incurred in prior fiscal years when it was unaware of its liability or the need to allocate funds to pay damages.
131. Id Professor Nowak agrees with Professor Tribe that the courts are not the proper agents to handle the delicate federalism issues involved in the question of federal court jurisdiction over the states. Congress is the only governmental entity that has a dual responsibility to the state and federal systems and is accountable at both levels. having to answer. Nevada argued that at the time the Constitution was ratified there was a common understanding that no sovereign was amenable to suit in any court without its consent, an understanding repeatedly reflected in Supreme Court opinions.
40
The Court rejected the argument that the Constitution implicitly denies one state jurisdiction over another. "In the past, this Court has presumed that the States intended to adopt policies of broad comity towards one another. But this presumption reflected an understanding of state policy, rather than a constitutional command."' 141 State immunity from suits in the courts of other states, the majority held, is only "a matter of comity" that the states may reject if they choose. 142 For the federal courts to hold "by inference from the structure of our Constitution and nothing else"' 43 that California was not free to enforce its own legal policies against another sovereign would constitute a severe intrusion on California's sovereignty contrary to the dictates of the tenth amendment. 44 The Hall decision does not directly relate to the question of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment. Nevertheless, the Court's rejection of Nevada's argument that the doctrine is implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution may indicate that the Court would also accept Professor Field's contention that the eleventh amendment does 140. 99 S. Ct. at 1185. See Justice Rehnquist's dissent for a detailed analysis of these cases. Id at 1194-99.
Nevada also argued that even if the California courts did have jurisdiction, the full faith and credit clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1, required California to observe a Nevada statute limiting the damages that could be awarded against the state. The Court rejected this contention. "Full faith and credit. . does not here enable one state to legislate for the other or to project its laws across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for itself the legal consequence of acts within it." 99 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1939) Id The Court noted that California's exercise ofjurisdiction posed "no substantial threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism." A simple personal injury case could "hardly interfere with Nevada's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities.' Id at 1190 n.24. The case offered no occasion to consider whether other state actions "might require a different analysis or a different result." Id Dismissing this reservation, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, termed the majority's holding as a "basic and undeniable ruling. . . that what we have always thought of as a sovereign State is now to be treated in the courts of a sister state. . . just as any other litigant." Id at 1192 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist also wrote a strong dissent: "mhe Court's decision today works a fundamental readjustment of interstate relationships which is impossible to reconcile not only with an 'assumption' this and other courts have entertained for almost 200 years, but also with express holdings of this Court and the logic of the constitutional plan itself." Id at 1194 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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not make sovereign immunity constitutionally required. In any event, the case indicates that the Supreme Court may be reconsidering the importance of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As the Court becomes less sympathetic to state immunity to suit, it may become even more sympathetic to the claim that Congress may subject states to suit in federal court.
D. Implications of the Eleventh Amendment Transition for the Differentiation of States and Their Subdivisions.
It is clear that eleventh amendment doctrine is undergoing rapid and far-reaching change. The scope of eleventh amendment immunity has been and may continue to be diminished through congressional action, while the decline of the constitutional status of sovereign immunity may ultimately shrink eleventh amendment protection still further.
The implications of these innovations in eleventh amendment jurisprudence are important to a proposal to dispense with the differentiation of states and their political subdivisions. Since the law is the throes of change, a further realignment could be accommodated with greater ease than it might were the law well settled. Further, as the number of instances in which the eleventh amendment will shelter states from suit in federal courts decreases, the impact of allowing political subdivisons to share in that reduced immunity lessens.
Of course, one might observe that if the states themselves are subjected to suit in federal court more often, the undesirable effects of distinguishing states from subdivisions will be diminished. For example, if states find themselves subject to frequent suits in federal court due to a narrowing of eleventh amendment protection, the fact that a delegation of power waives their narrow immunity may carry so little weight as never to deter states from freely delegating duties to subdivisions. Accordingly, the intrusion on the principles of federalism will not be as great as it is now. However slight the impact that differentiation ultimately has on federalism, though, there is still cause to discontinue the practice. First, since there is no utility in the differentiation to counterbalance the harm to federalism, there is no reason to tolerate the encroachment, however small. Further, abandoning the deviant definition of "state" under the eleventh amendment and adopting the definition as it is used in other parts of the Constitution will bring greater consistency and coherence to the interpretation of the document as a whole. Finally, by treating states and their subdivisions in the same way, federal courts would be freed from the difficult and fruitless task of distinguishing between those subdivisions that are "arms of the state" and those that are not. 45 
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts have treated political subdivisions of the states as independent entities for eleventh amendment purposes despite the fact that this practice furthers no eleventh amendment goals and is contrary to sound principles of federalism. Current trends in eleventh amendment and sovereign immunity jurisprudence offer a unique opportunity for the courts to discontinue this practice and to grant political subdivisions immunity from suit in federal court that is equal in scope to the immunity enjoyed by their parent states. This reassessment would yield consistent treatment of states and subdivisions in all constitutional matters, add coherence to the Court's interpretation of the Constitution as a whole, and eliminate an unjustified restriction on the discretion of the states.
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145. See text accompanying notes 50-91 supra.
